现金股利政策常常成为上市公司控股股东进行利益侵占的手段,但股权分置改革前后控股股东影响现金股利政策的动机存在差异。本文选取股权分置改革后中国上市公司的数据,实证检验了控股股东对上市公司现金股利政策的影响。研究发现,股权分置改革后上市公司控股股东的利益侵占水平和现金股利发放负相关;控股股东的持股比例与现金股利发放正相关,控股股东持股比例的增加会减弱利益侵占和现金股利之间的相互替代关系。研究结论说明,股权分置改革后上市公司控股股东在考虑侵占成本的前提下,会提高现金股利的发放水平。

Cash dividend policy is often used for expropriation by the controlling shareholders in listed companies, but the controlling shareholders’ cash dividend motivation is different before and after the split-share structure reform. The paper selects samples of Chinese listed companies after the split-share structure reform, empirically tests the controlling share-holders’ influence on cash dividend policy of listed companies, the results show that the expropriated by controlling share-holders is negatively related to the cash dividends, the controlling shareholder’ stake ratio is positively related to cash divi-dends, the increasing of controlling shareholder ’ stake in the listed companies will decrease the substitute relationship between expropriation and cash dividends. It suggests that the listed companies’ controlling shareholders will increase the cash dividend distribution after the split-share structure reform, considering the cost of expropriation.

主要考察了作为内部治理机制的内部控制制度和外部治理机制的外部审计制度对上市公司控股股东利益侵占行为的制约作用。研究发现，内部控制质量高的公司有助于抑制控股股东的利益侵占行为，并且随着内部控制质量的提高，公司聘请高质量外部审计师的动机越大。研究还发现公司选择高质量外部审计师的概率越大，控股股东的侵占行为越小。说明无论是内部控制制度，还是外部审计监督制度，均具有一定的治理效应。

The paper examines whether internal control as an internal governance mechanism and external audi -ting as an external governance mechanism of firms can restrain the controlling shareholders ’ expropriation .Our re-search finds that high quality internal control contributes to restrain the controlling shareholders ''expropriate behav-ior,and with the improvement of quality of internal control ,the higher likelihood for company to choose the auditors known for high quality .Our research also finds that the greater probability that companies choose the high quality auditing lead to the less control shareholders ’ expropriate behavior .It means internal control and external auditing have some governance effects .

近年来大股东纷纷将所属场外资产注入其控股的上市公司，文章从产业链整合与利益侵占两个角度分析了大股东资产注入的动机及影响，并实证检验大股东资产注入的经济后果，发现：资产注入后上市公司的长期市场业绩出现下滑，投资者在资产注入后购买上市公司股票并持有1年以上将会遭受损失，该结果支持大股东资产注入的利益侵占动机。另外，发现注入资产类型直接影响上市公司的长期业绩表现，注入相关资产的长期业绩好于注入非相关资产，支持相关资产注入的产业链整合动机。

In recent years , a lot of large shareholders have injected stripping assets into the listed companies under their control.From the two perspectives of integration of the industrial chain and tunneling of interests , this paper analyzes the moti-vation of the large shareholder''s asset injection and effects on company performance , and empirically tests the economic conse-quences of the practice .It is found that long-term market performance of companies after assets injection begins to decline .In-vestors who purchase and hold a company''s shares for a year after asset injection suffer losses .This finding matches the motiva-tion of interest tunneling of the large shareholder .In addition, long-term market performance is correlated with the type of as-set injection.It is better when injecting into related assets than unrelated assets , a finding that matches the motivation of inte-gration of industrial chain of listed companies .