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双语推荐:股东

依据2006~2011年沪深两市上市公司数据,考量不同类型的外资持股对中国上市公司大股东侵占的约束影响。结果表明,外资持股未能有效制约大股东侵占行为,不同性质的境外投资者对抑制大股东侵占的作用存在差异。QFII能够一定程度上抑制大股东对小股东利益的侵占,而银行、保险和证券公司持股均不能对上市公司大股东侵占形成有效监督和制约,不仅未减轻大股东对小股东的利益侵占,反而加重了上市公司大股东和中小股东的利益冲突。
Based on data of listed companies through 2006~2011 of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock markets,this study empirically examines the restraining effect on the controlling share-holders of listed companies in China by different types of foreign shareholders.We find that for-eign shareholders on the whole cannot effectively restrain the expropriation of large shareholders, and different types of foreign shareholders have significantly different effects on the restraint of controlling shareholders expropriation.QFII can inhibit the expropriation of controlling share-holders to some extent,while shareholders of foreign banks,insurance companies and securities companies have no significant influence on controlling shareholders expropriation,which can not supervise and restrain the controlling shareholders of listed companies,and sometimes even weaken the conflicts between the controlling shareholders and the minor shareholders of listed companies.The restraining effect of foreign shareholders in

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累积投票制的宗旨是保护中小股东选出代言人,但我国公司运行实践中从该制度获益的不是中小股东而是二、三股东们。更具讽刺意味的是获益的二三股东们却不领情,领情的广大中小股东又难获益。原因是中小股东想要通过累积投票权选出代言人的门槛太高,以致承载中小股东希望的累积投票制变成了大股东迎合监管层的一种故作姿态。本文站在中小股东的视角,秉承累积投票制创立之精神,尊重我国《公司法》立法原意,深入分析中小股东累积投票将遇到的一个个门槛,针对不同的门槛分别给出了降低门槛的建议。
Cumulative voting system is to protect that minority shareholders can elect the spokesperson, but in the practice of China''s companies the second or the third shareholders can benefit from the system not small and medium-sized shareholders. Ironically the second or the third shareholders who get the benefits are un-grateful but the vast number of small and medium shareholders who are grateful cannot get the benefit. The reason is the threshold which the medium and small shareholders want to elect the spokesperson through the cumulative voting is too high, so that the system of cumulative voting changes into the intentional attitude that the strong stock holders cater to the regulators. The author, in the perspective of the small and medium-sized shareholders, adhering to the spirit of the creation of the cumulative voting system, respecting the legislative intent of China''s Company Law, analyzed those small and medium-sized shareholders cumulative voting would meet several

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股东平等是公司法的基本原则之一,然而近年来,控股股东利用对公司的控制,作出不利于中小股东的决策,使中小股东利益受到侵害的事件频频发生。因此,法律有必要在司法救济方面加强规定,为中小股东在权益受到侵害或正在受侵害时,提起司法救济提供可能。文章从保护中小股东权益的角度出发,通过对国外中小股东权益保护制度的比较研究,提出了中小股东权益的司法救济与保护的途径——股东直接诉讼和股东代表诉讼。
Shareholder equality is one of the basic principles of company law. But in recent years, the company’s controlling shareholders often use the control to the company, make decisions that are not conducive to minority shareholders, so that interests of small shareholders infringed frequent occurrence. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the provisions of the law in terms of judicial relieves, for minority shareholders provide judicial remedies when their rights are or were infringed. From the perspective of the protection of minority shareholders interests, the article compares the foreign minority shareholders protection systems and put forward the judicial relief and protection way of minority shareholders rights:the shareholder direct litigation and the shareholder derivative action.

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我国《公司法》规定了有限责任公司的股权转让制度,股权可以在股东之间相互转让,也可以向股东以外的其他人转让,该项股权转让制度无论在立法理念还是在立法技术上均有较大的突破,但尚有许多不足之处还需进一步完善。股权转让引起股东人数变化后,应当区分股东人数只有1人和超出50人两种情况分别加以规定;股东优先购买权制度的规定过于简单和概括,不利于各方利益的保护,应当对股东优先购买权的行使条件、行使期限和法律责任作出更加具体、明确的规定;公司章程可以对股东股权转让进行限制,但必须兼顾转让股东的利益,不得违反法律强制性规定和法律的基本原则,不得限制股东对股权处分的自由。
@@@@Corporation Law of China stipulates that shareholders of limited companies enjoy the right to transfer shares among holders or to others .Both the legislative ideas and technology of the share transfer system has a great breakthrough ,however ,there are still many shortcomings in such related stipulations to be improved .When number of shareholders change after transfer ,different regulations should be stipu‐lated based on different situations of shareholder of more than 50 and only 1 .The regulation of shareholde‐rs’ priority to purchase is too simple and general and not good for the protection of the interests of all par‐ties involved .Specific and clear regulations should be regulated on conditions ,time limit and legal liability on shareholders’ priority to purchase .Articles of association of limited companies may impose restrictions on share transfer ,while they must take account of the interests of transfer shareholders and shall not breach the legal compulsor

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本文以中国A股上市公司2003-2005年期间的数据为样本,实证分析了公司内部治理结构和外部治理环境对控股股东与管理者合谋侵占公司利益的行为产生的影响。研究结果表明:控股股东的持股比例与其对上市公司的资金占用正相关,而非控股大股东的持股比例与控股大股东对上市公司的资金占用负相关;集团控股股东对上市公司的资金占用程度显著高于非集团控股股东;董事会中内部董事的比例与控股大股东的资金占用正相关;地区法治化水平和政府干预程度这两个外部治理环境因素也对控股股东的行为产生了显著影响,地区法治化水平越高,政府干预程度越低,控股股东占用上市公司的资金越少。
Based on the fiscal data of A-share listed companies from 2003-2005 in China,this article tests the influence of internal governance structure and external governance environment on collusion between control shareholders and managers.The results show that: controlling shareholders' stock proportion is positively related to their use of the listed company's fund,while non-controlling major shareholders' stock proportion is negatively related to controlling shareholders' fund use;Group controlling shareholders' fund use is obviously higher than that of non-group controlling shareholders;The proportion of internal directors is positively related to controlling shareholders' fund use;Two external factors from the governance environment: local legislation level and government inference also have an important effect on control shareholders' behavior.

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股东关联贷款对商业银行发展的影响与银行贷款危机密不可分。文中分析了股东关联贷款与银行贷款危机之间的关系,着重就股东关联贷款对商业银行影响进行研究,并提出了防范和降低商业银行股东关联贷款风险的政策建议。
The shareholder loans of commercial banks related development impact of the crisis and bank loans are inseparable.This article analyzes association between the shareholder loans and the crisis of bank loan,focusing on shareholder loans of commercial banks association,and proposed to prevent and reduce the risk of commercial bank lending policies related shareholder proposals.

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公司的股利政策是公司股东之间,股东与管理者之间的博弈过程。本文基于代理成本理论,通过选取2004年至2012年A股上市企业为研究样本,着重研究具备绝对控股地位的超级股东对企业股利政策的作用,同时研究排名前十的股东集中度对企业股利政策的影响。研究发现超级股东的力量越大时,股利政策越趋近负向,公司其他股东无法对超级大股东形成有效制衡。
The dividend policy of company is the game process between the company ′s shareholders and managers . Based on agent cost theory , and by selecting A-share listed companies as research samples from 2004 to 2012 , the arti-cle focuses on the big shareholder′s impact on dividend policy , and studies the top ten shareholder′s influence of the con-centration on corporate dividend policy at the same time .The study finds that the greater the shareholder′s power , the closer to the negative dividend policy , the company′s other shareholders can′t affect super large shareholders to form divi-dend policy .

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企业所有权视角的研究认为,控股股东代理问题的产生原因是控股股东对控制权私人收益的追求,产生条件是控制权与现金流权的偏离.文章从现代企业制度视角分析控股股东代理问题的产生机制,认为现代企业制度为控股股东基于自利目的的侵占行为提供了可能和行为能力,为控股股东利益侵占的后果承担提供了免责机制,使控股股东代理问题的产生具备了一定的制度基础.
From the perspective of ownership, the controlling shareholders pursuing private benefits of corporate control right is the reason for the agency problem of the controlling shareholders,and it happens in the context of the separation of control right and cash flow right. The paper analyzes the mechanism of the agency problem of the controlling shareholders from the perspective of modern enterprise system. This study shows that the modern enterprise system provides certain insti?tutional arrangements for the occurrence of the controlling shareholders’ agency problem, the arrangements give the con?trolling shareholders reasons and ability to encroach on the interests of other shareholders based on the pursuit of their pri?vate benefits,and also offer the exemption mechanism for the controlling shareholders not to take the consequences.

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在隐名出资股东资格认定问题上,《公司法解释三》区分内部法律关系与外部法律关系,分别采取不同的调整规则。在内部关系上,根据"谁出资,谁受益"的原则,实际出资人是股权的最终归属者;在外部关系上,依据股东名册记载和工商登记的内容确定股东资格,实际出资人的身份"转正",必须受到其他股东同意权的限制,笔者认为,此限制应当和股东对外转让股权适用一致的同意权比例标准,即"经其他股东过半数同意"。根据外观主义理论,并基于名义股东与实际出资人之间的特殊法律关系,名义股东应与实际出资人就瑕疵出资对公司债权人承担连带赔偿责任。
Anonymous contribution relates to internal legal relationship between actual investor and nominal shareholder, as well as the external legal relationship between actual investors, shareholders and third parties. On the problem of identification of dormant shareholders'' qualifications, "Judicial Interpretation Three about Company Law"takes a double standard, rather than a single substantive standard. The proportion of shareholders'' consent rights about identity recognition of actual investor should be same as transfer of ownership,that is, "by the consent of a majority of the other shareholders.

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使用面板门槛模型研究发现,境外股东在中国股市充当了一定"调节器"的角色,即:当股价波动剧烈时,境外股东增持可以降低波动;当股票交易不活跃时,境外股东增持又能活跃市场。同时,境外股东持股对中国股市的影响存在门槛效应:境外股东持股市盈率、资产负债率相对高和基金持股相对少而波动性较大的企业时,境外股东持股能降低股价波动、股票收益率波动和系统风险;反之则会增加股市风险。应引导境外股东战略持股市盈率较高、资产负债率较高的股价波动较大的上市公司,从而充分发挥其"调节器"作用。
By using the panel threshold model, this paper finds that the foreign shareholders play a certain“regulator” role in Chinese stock market, namely foreign shareholders can increase their shareholding amount to reduce the volatility when stock prices are seriously fluctuating and can increase their shareholding amount to activate the market when stock exchange is not active, specifically, foreign shareholders can reduce stock price volatility, share earnings rate risk and system risk when foreign shareholders buy the shares of the listed companies with relatively high price earning ratio and asset-liability ratio, with relatively small holding of funds and with big volatility, otherwise, their risk is increased. Therefore, China should introduce the listed companies with high market earnings rate and liabilities rate and with big share price volatility to foreign shareholders to strategically hold the shares of the companies so that their “regulator” role can be sufficiently played.